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Aristotle’s definition for citizen was this: “Who is a citizen? A citizen is everyone capable to govern and be governed.” There are thirty thousand million citizens in Europe. Why are they all not competent to govern? Because the mainstream political ideology aims exactly at preventing citizens from learning how to govern and be governed (to know both sides of power). Consequently, cultivates the logic that governance should be assigned to the “experts”. This indicates that there’s an anti-political education, proportional to the ultra-individualist imaginary, which leads to passiveness and, hence, consumerism. Mass societies produce individuals who instead of undertaking political responsibilities and initiatives, become addicted to following and voting for the political choices someone else has prepared for them, exactly as they don’t  get to decide what kind of goods they want to produce, how to produce them or in which way they want to distribute them.

— 3 months ago
december 24th, 2013

how can i be

more sincere

more honest

more patient

try to understand more

learn more

listen more

and also be more coherent

i want to improve

but also be real

— 3 months ago

“rem koolhaas wanted a ‘view filter’ on each side of the hall. the term ‘view filter’ felt totally obvious yet also very vague: a view filter to what degree, with what purpose? to filter out, to tone down, spread light, obscure, fade, bluer what is visible behind it? or to envelope the room, create an aesthetic backdrop for the orchestra, allowing the gaze to sense the outside, to see sky, trees, sculpture and city?”

— 5 months ago

Imagine how powerless
people would feel if their commonality and participation were
simply defined by pre-given frameworks, by institutions and laws,
as in other social contexts they are through kinship. What would
the world look like if all ways of being public were more like
applying for a driver’s license or subscribing to a professional
group - if, that is, formally organized mediations replaced the selforganized
public as the image of belonging and common activity?
Such is the image of totalitarianism: non-kin society organized by
bureaucracy and law.

Without a faith, justified or not, in self-organized
publics, organically linked to our activity in their very existence,
capable ofbeing addressed, and capable of action, we would
be nothing but the peasants of capital - which, of course, we might
be, and some of us more than others.

The result can b e a kind of political depressiveness, a
blockage in activity and optimism, a disintegration of politics
toward isolation, frustration, anomie, forgetfulness.

The self-organized nature of the
public does not mean that it is always spontaneous or organically
expressive of individuals’ wishes. In fact, although the premise of
self-organizing discourse is necessary to the peculiar cultural artifact that we call a public, it is contradicted both by material limits

- means of production and distribution, the physical textual
objects, social conditions of access - and by internal ones, including
the need to presuppose forms of intelligibility already in place,
as well as the social closure entailed by any selection of genre, idiolect,
style, address, and so on. 

I will return to these constraints
of circulation.

For the moment, I want to emphasize that they are
made to seem arbitrary because of the performativity of public
address and the self-organization implied by the idea of a public.

interaction is framed by a social relationship.

A public is a relation among strangers.

to a public incorporates that tendency of writing or speech as a
condition of possibility.

A public, however, unites strangers through participation
alone, at least in theory. Strangers come into relationship by its
means, though the resulting social relationship might be peculiarly
indirect and unspecifiable.

address of public speech is both personal and impersonal. Public speech can have great urgency and intimate import. Yet we know that it was addressed not exactly to us but to the stranger we were until the moment we happened to be addressed by it. 

The benefit in this practice is that it gives a
general social relevance to private thought and life. 

Our subjectivity
is understood as having resonance with others, and immediately
so. But this is only true to the extent that the trace of our
strangerhood remains present in our understanding of ourselves
as the addressee.

A public is constituted through mere attention.

Because a public exists only by virtue of address, it must predicate
some degree of attention, however notional, from its members.
The cognitive quality of that attention is less important than
the mere fact of active uptake. Attention is the principal sorting
category by which members and nonmembers are discriminated.
If you are reading this, or hearing it or seeing it or present for it,
you are part of this public.

It is even possible
for us to understand someone sleeping through a ballet performance
as a member of that ballet’s public, because most contemporary
ballet performances are organized as voluntary events,
open to anyone willing to attend or, in most cases, to pay to
attend. The act of attention involved in showing up is enough to
create an addressable public. Some kind of active uptake, however
somnolent, is indispensable.

Publics, by contrast, lacking any
institutional being, commence with the moment of attention,
must continually predicate renewed attention, and cease to exist
when attention is no longer predicated. They are virtual entities,
not voluntary associations. Because their threshold of belonging
is an active uptake, however, they can be understood within the

conceptual framework of civil society; that is, as having a free,
voluntary, and active membership.

A public is the social space created by the reflexive circulation of

a public is understood to be an ongoing space of encounter
for discourse. Not texts themselves create publics, but the concatenation
of texts through time. 

Anything that addresses a public is meant to undergo circulation.
This helps us to understand why print, and the organization
of markets for print, were historically so central in the development
of the public sphere.

— 6 months ago

changes in the medium of present-day perception can be understood as a
decay of the aura, it is possible to demonstrate the social determinants of
that decay.
What, then, is the aura? A strange tissue of space and time: the unique
apparition of a distance, however near it may be.

the social basis of the aura’s present decay: the desire
of the present-day masses to “get closer” to things, and their equally passionate
concern for overcoming each thing’s uniqueness [Oberwindung
des Einmaligen jeder Gegebenheit] by assimilating it as a reproduction.

The uniqueness of the work of art is identical to its embedded ness in
the context of tradition

the unique value of the “authentic” work of
art alwa’)ls has its basis in ritual.

But as soon as the criterion of authenticity
ceases to be applied to artistic production, the whole social function of
art is revolutionized. Instead of being founded on ritual, it is based on a
different practice: politics.

— 6 months ago
The Moth, The Mountains, The Rivers

Who can guess the luna’s sadness who lives so
briefly? Who can guess the impatience of stone
longing to be ground down, to be part again of
something livelier? Who can imagine in what
heaviness the rivers remember their original

Strange questions, yet I have spent worthwhile
time with them. And I suggest them to you also,
that your spirit grow in curiosity, that your life
be richer than it is, that we — so clever, and 
ambitious, and selfish, and unrestrained — are only
one design of the moving, the vivacious many.

Mary Oliver

— 9 months ago


Charles Bergquist


— 9 months ago with 239 notes